The promulgation of the National Security Law that develops, according to Article 23 of the Basic Law (the so-called mini-Constitution of the island), the crimes of treason, secession, sedition, or subversion against the central government, among others, somehow culminates the involution of a Hong Kong finally brought back to the discipline of the Chinese Communist Party.

By Juan Pablo Cardenal

The dead man was very dead but had to be finished off. The approval yesterday in Hong Kong of a controversial national security law puts an end to what Hong Kong was in 1997, the year in which China regained sovereignty over the former British colony after a century and a half. Twenty-seven years ago, the territory was the best example of prosperity and freedom in Asia. A model of success based on the rule of law, strong institutions, separation of powers and a vibrant civil society, including a press that relentlessly exercised its role of scrutinizing power.

Of all that, practically nothing remains today. The promulgation of the National Security Law that develops, according to Article 23 of the Basic Law (the so-called mini-Constitution of the island), the crimes of treason, secession, sedition, or subversion against the central government, among others, somehow culminates the involution of a Hong Kong finally brought back to the discipline of the Chinese Communist Party, as just any another Chinese province. A quarter of a century ago, many optimists believed that China's democratization would be inevitable. Today, the harsh reality is quite different: a democratic Hong Kong destroyed.  

NGOs and dissident voices criticize the "broad and imprecise" definition of terms such as "state secrets" or "foreign interference", as well as the severity of the penalties provided for in the law. Accused of treason, insurrection and incitement to mutiny to members of the Chinese Armed Forces face life imprisonment. For espionage or sabotage endangering national security or damaging public infrastructure, up to 20 years. And up to 14 years for engaging in activities of banned organizations, 10 years for revealing state secrets, and 7 years for sedition, a charge that does not require the requirement of "violent intent˝.   

According to The Times, Hong Kongers can "be convicted and imprisoned for sedition for keeping old copies of newspapers," such as the shuttered pro-democracy Apple Daily. The new legislation also establishes the crime of "treason by negligence", punishable by up to 14 years in prison for anyone who knows of conduct that "undermines state security" and fails to report it. It also provides for police detention without charge for up to 16 days and denial of legal representation within 48 hours.

The previous attempt to introduce this legislation failed in 2003, after a broad popular rejection and a demonstration of half a million people forced the authorities to withdraw it. Yesterday, as an example of how things have changed in Hong Kong, the law passed with patriotic unanimity in the local legislature: 89 votes in favor, zero against. However, critics have no doubts about the real purpose of the law: to silence any criticism of the authorities and ensure that the slightest dissent does not go unpunished. For Chris Patten, the last British governor of the former colony, it is "another big nail in the coffin of human rights and the rule of law in Hong Kong and a new and shameful violation of the Joint Declaration".

The Sino-British Declaration of 1984, a binding international treaty signed by Margaret Thatcher and Deng Xiaoping, agreed on the transfer of powers and the terms of the transition, which included Beijing's commitment to grant a high degree of autonomy and to maintain Hong Kong's values until 2047, all under the formula of "one country, two systems", which fitted Hong Kong capitalism into the authoritarian Chinese system. This guaranteed rights and freedoms, judicial independence, the rule of law and freedom of press and association for 50 years.

But Beijing soon disgraced that commitment. Chinese government interference in Hong Kong and the public's perception that their freedoms were eroding sparked, in 2014, the "Umbrella Revolution." So-called pro-democracy forces resisting Hong Kong's accelerated integration into mainland China took to the streets, intermittently paralyzing the city during five years of chaos and pitched battles with police. In 2020 Beijing said enough was enough and imposed China's security law on Hong Kong. Hundreds of activists and students were detained.

Since then, at least 68 have been convicted and it is estimated that more than 200,000 Hong Kongers have been forced to emigrate. Many activists and NGOs, including Amnesty International or Human Rights Watch, and many journalists and media such as The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal or AFP, had to move their regional headquarters out of Hong Kong. The exodus of capital, talent and companies is unstoppable.

In 2021, Hong Kong reformed the electoral law to reduce to 22% the seats elected by direct universal suffrage in the Legislative Council, in addition to introducing the requirement of patriotic suitability in the pre-screening of candidates. This explains the unanimous approval and vote on the domestic security law. Hong Kong Chief Executive John Lee said yesterday that the law protects against invaders. "We must correctly understand that there must be one country before two systems, and the two systems must not be used to resist one country," he concluded.

A Hong Kong unrecognizable to those of us who have lived there.

Juan Pablo Cardenal

Synic Analysis Editor

Writer, journalist. Foreign correspondent in China for various Spanish newspapers between 2003 and 2014, focusing on China’s international expansion since 2009. Since then, he has done research on the consequences of China’s investments, infrastructure and loans in 40 different countries from 4 continents. The research resulted in books he co-authored, among them “La silenciosa conquista China” (2011) and “La imparable conquista de China” (2015), which were translated to 12 languages. Since 2016, he has directed research projects oriented to understanding China’s soft power and Beijing’s strategy to achieve political influence in Latin America. He has been a speaker in various international conferences and has published articles in El País, El Mundo, Clarín, The New York Times, Project Syndicate and the South China Morning Post. His last book is “La telaraña” (2020), on the internacional thread of political crisis in Catalunia.