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The final results in Moldova were more of a relief than a celebration. The elections were a pro-Western victory at Moscow’s expense, yes, but by very narrow margins. It was not the absolute consolidation of a European path, so relevant in the context of the divisions that followed Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Nor was it a former Soviet republic saying goodbye forever to the Kremlin and its influence. Nothing is that concrete or certain. In the spots where East and West, Russia and NATO, clash—especially since Vladimir Putin came to power—in that contested land, little can be taken for granted.
Between October and November, two elections were held in this small country, neighboring Romania and Ukraine, one of the poorest territories in Europe in terms of GDP per capita. Both elections were deeply intertwined, as Maia Sandu, Head of State since 2020, represents the most pro-European vision of local politics and led the process resulting in the EU candidacy in June 2022. Sandu was running for re-election. At the same time, a referendum was held to include the popular mandate to join the continental bloc in the Constitution, as had already happened in Ukraine in 2019 and in Georgia a year earlier.
The main opposition in Moldova, the Party of Socialists, called for a boycott of the referendum, arguing that it would be used by the president to bolster her victory. Unlike the Party of Communists, which promoted a vote against the Constitution's amendment, the socialist strategy aimed to prevent the minimum required turnout of 33% from being reached. If it was not met, the referendum would be invalid, which would have saved them from appearing as an anti-EU party in a country where nearly 65% of the population supports joining the bloc.
The affirmative, pro-European vote emerged victorious, but by less than half a percentage point. And if votes from abroad, which accounted for just over 15%, were omitted, the NO would have won by almost 5%. Sandu celebrated and was congratulated by her allies in Europe, but there was little to cheer about. Winning by such a narrow margin is not good news for the EU in one of the continent's most underdeveloped countries, partially occupied by Russia since the Soviet dissolution and neighboring Ukraine, invaded by the same Russia. In this context, the pro-Western vote (or rather, anti-Moscow) should have been overwhelming. And this was not the case in the referendum, nor in the two rounds of elections to choose the president.
Sandu won, yes, and will continue to preside over Moldova for the next four years. But her 55% in the runoff appears somewhat diminished. Considering only local votes, the socialist candidate, Alexandr Stoianoglo, won by just over 1.2%. This may seem like a minimal difference, but it will be enough to fuel the narrative that he represents Moldovans who live in Moldova, who know Moldova; whereas she, who obtained over 80% of the foreign vote (around 20% of the total), represents foreign interests.
A week before the second round in Moldova, there were parliamentary elections in Georgia, another former Soviet republic that is also an EU candidate. It is no coincidence that the political sector in both countries aiming to improve relations with Russia has used a similar discourse to refer to their rivals: something along the lines of "we represent the locals; you, the foreigners." For Sandu, countering that narrative will be an important challenge, while at the same time beginning to close a rift that has only widened since Russia invaded neighboring Ukraine: the polarization between moving closer to Moscow or shutting that relationship entirely and focusing exclusively on Brussels.
On the other hand, it is also repeated that the political faction closest to Russia (or outright "pro-Russian," according to some) in both countries claims to support the EU and to advance in the candidacy process. This is a drastic change from 2020, when the Party of the Socialists’ candidate, Igor Dodon, was openly pro-Putin. Today, in both Georgia and Moldova, this faction targets voters who want to restore closer ties with Moscow despite seeing their country's future in Europe. The apparent contradiction is justified by the fear that a pro-Western government could provoke the Kremlin and drag the country into a new war. In this sense, the Eurosceptic factions offer a well-known argument: Ukraine. This is the threat that constantly looms over the former Soviet republics that are not part of NATO, that lack the economic strength to guarantee stability and autonomy, and whose political system is democratic enough to allow genuine political change through elections. Of the 15 former Soviet republics, only four meet these criteria: Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine, and Armenia. The first three are EU candidates. The remaining one, traditionally Russia's main ally in the South Caucasus, has noticeably distanced itself in the last two years, even suspending its participation in the Collective Security Treaty Organization, the Moscow-led military alliance, and going so far as to accuse the Kremlin of attempting a coup against Nikol Pashinyan's government this year.
Without an invasion, Moscow's interference was still felt in the Moldovan elections. According to Maia Sandu’s national security advisor, Stanislav Secrieru, on November 3, the day of the runoff, there was "massive Russian interference," which he claimed had "high potential to distort the result." Shortly before the first round, Sandu said she had evidence that "a criminal group was seeking to buy 300,000 votes." The accused was Ilan Shor, an oligarch convicted of committing the largest bank fraud in Moldova’s history, who fled and now lives in Moscow with Russian citizenship. He is alleged to have transferred $39 million through the Russian state bank Promsvyazbank to buy votes. Does this mean direct Kremlin influence? Not necessarily, but the context certainly raises suspicions.
At the same time, Moldova’s electoral commission reported being aware of the supposed organized transportation of voters by air and land from Russia to Belarus, Azerbaijan, and Turkey, where there were more polling stations than in Russia itself, home to around 150,000 Moldovans. It is the first time something like this has happened during an election in Moldova, and Shor himself may have funded those trips. In any case, the 82% Sandu received from abroad in the runoff proves that, if this method aimed to benefit Stoianoglo, it was of little relevance. The socialist candidate himself said that "the level of Russian interference in Moldova is greatly exaggerated." And he might be right.
If support for the EU were truly overwhelming, foreign interference would be of little importance. On the other hand, if Russian meddling had indeed been so extensive, the Moldovan government could present that slim 0.4% advantage in the referendum as a great achievement in the face of adversity. The government of a small country defeating, against all odds, the giant neighbor. It would still be an admission of state weakness in the face of foreign interference, which would bolster the argument about a possible Russian invasion. "If we are so vulnerable," the opposition could say, "we should get along even better with our potential enemy."
But perhaps the Russian interference (possibly even exaggerated) is merely an excuse that obscures the core issue. The factions seeking a better relationship with Moscow have the concrete argument of fear, of threats, of images from Ukraine on their side. What does the opposing side have to offer? What can the EU provide to convince Moldovan or Georgian voters not only that they should want to be part of the bloc, but also that they should reject any rapprochement with Russia? Initially, Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission, promised Sandu €1.8 billion in financial aid before the elections, a measure that could even be considered a violation of Moldova’s electoral code: foreign actors’ involvement during elections.
In all three votes (the referendum and both rounds of the presidential election), turnout was around 50%. This is not an exceptionally low figure; rather, it is quite normal in Moldova, where no option seems to inspire great enthusiasm. At the same time, political polarization is compounded by socioeconomic factors: Sandu and the YES vote won in the central regions of the country, the most urbanized; Stoianoglo and the NO vote, in the north, south, and east, in predominantly rural areas where the Russian language is more common, but also in the Transnistria region, where Russia has stationed at least 1,500 troops. In the Autonomous Region of Gagauzia, by far the country’s poorest area, 98% voted NO and 97% voted for Stoianoglo.
Russian threats are not enough to unify a society deciding its future amidst a turbulent context, but neither are Brussels' limited arguments. It is grave that the EU cannot convincingly demonstrate that it is a better alternative than Putin’s Russia, with its repression, its punishments, and its invasions of neighboring countries. It is no coincidence that electoral successes of Eurosceptic and/or Russophile parties are becoming increasingly common, and not only with Viktor Orbán in Hungary or Law and Justice in Poland. Now, they are joined by the Freedom Party in Austria and its counterpart in the Netherlands, Marine Le Pen's National Rally in France, Alternative for Germany, or Smer-SD in Slovakia. The West needs to offer something that can overcome fear, something concrete, not just promises of eventual EU memberships that carry inevitable utopias. Moldova and Georgia have shown in recent weeks that this is not enough, that a strategy change is needed. Otherwise, the 2025 parliamentary elections, when Moldova's next government will be elected, will be far more about fear than about relief.
